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Collins' piece on the teleological argument is thought-provoking. After
arguing that the fine-tuning of the constants, laws and forces of nature is
more probable on theism than on a naturalistic single-universe hypothesis,
he considers the stiffer competition of a hypothesis that there are an infinite
number of universes, some of which seem bound to have life-permitting
conditions like ours. His assessment: "usually these universes are thought
to be produced by some sort of physical mechanism, which I will call a
many-universe generator .... [but the] generator itself would need to be welldesigned" (143-5). This response assumes that there is no guarantee that
the universes in question will play out all the nomological possibilities, even
if there are an infinity of them; one still needs a designer to generate life. I
am still puzzling over whether this interesting suggestion is plausible.
Though some of the essays in it are better than others, taken as a whole,
this anthology offers a strong cumulative case for theism-one that comes
from many voices, offering better versions of the usual arguments than
their classical forms. It could serve as a good text for a philosophy of religion course, if it were coupled with an extended argument for atheism to
ensure even-handedness. Prospective users should be aware, however,
that some parts of the text seem to speak to a Christian audience (e.g.,
Moser develops an account of knowledge based on I Corinthians, see also
150-151, 199, 231), so it would function better in a Christian setting than,
say, at a public university. This is unfortunate, since the aim of the book is
to persuade people that theism is rational, and many who could be persuaded are in non-Christian settings.

Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics, Peter van Inwagen.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. ix + 261. $65 (cloth);
$23 (paperback).
JONATHAN L. KV ANVIG, University of Missouri
The experience of reading this book is precisely that experience that drew
many of us to philosophy in the first place-it is full of insight and precision, two properties not always conjoined in philosophical discourse (said
with a British accent to indicate the humor of understatement). The philosophically smug will find much to criticize-that my left leg is not a material object, for instance. And van Inwagen often makes pronouncements
that will strike one as a bit too arrogant-most often under the rubric of
"not understanding" what a philosopher might mean when making any of
various claims which van Inwagen refuses to endorse (such as that identity
through time might fail of transitivity). His criticisms· and complaints are
not superficial, however; they are instead the product of decades of trying
to work through completely and carefully the implications of various positions and arguments.
This book is a collection of thirteen of van Inwagen's essays in metaphysics published over the past twenty-five years or so, organized by the
concepts in the title. It also contains an informative introduction by van
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Inwagen explaining how he conceives of the general categories into which
the essays fall.
The essays in the ontology section are: "Meta-ontology," "Why I don't
understand substitutional quantification," "Creatures of fiction," and
"Why is there anything at all?". The essays in the identity section are: "The
doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts," "Composition as identity," "Fourdimensional objects," "Temporal parts and identity across time," and
"Materialism and the psychological-continuity account of personal identity." The essays in the modality section are: "Indexicality and actuality,"
"Plantinga on trans-world identity," "Two concepts of possible worlds,"
and "Modal epistemology." The articles span the work of more than two
decades, with the earliest article in the collection originally appearing in
1977 and the latest in 2000.
A critic will find some of the articles more troubling than others. For
example, the personal identity paper spends some time addressing the
relationship between psychological continuity and the identity theory,
according to which a mental state is identical with a brain state, but has little to say about other kinds of materialist theories of the mind and the relationship of such theories to personal identity. Some will balk as well at van
Inwagen's mantra of claiming not to understand the views of his opponents, but the claim is explained often enough that even where it is left
unexplained, there is no good reason to think it an insubstantial remark. In
some cases, the argument is not compelling, as in van Inwagen's attack on
the doctrine of temporal parts. He is successful in clarifying an alternative
view of the matter, and explaining how this alternative view would find
the doctrine of temporal parts troubling, but there is little in the argument
to persuade either holders of the doctrine or neutral observers that there is
something deeply wrong with the doctrine. One last critical remark: the
position on creatures of fiction employs a technical use of an ascription
relation, and in virtue of the technical construal needed, takes the ascription relation as primitive as well. Here, I don't understand. I don't see
how one can use the notion of a property being ascribed to an object,
observe that the understanding of the notion of ascription is not the ordinary one, and yet take the technical notion to be primitive. I simply do not
know what relation the use of such a phrase expresses in such a case.
Beyond these quibbles, however, is a raft of superb philosophical work,
and one simply cannot read any of these papers carefully and not come
away more educated. Moreover, there are many classic papers here, in the
sense that no one competently working on the topic can fail to take them
into account. I think here especially of the papers on substitutional quantification, four-dimensionalism, material constitution, and perhaps a bit
surprising, the paper on modal epistemology.
In sum, the collection is simply superb, and even though there are getting to be a few too many collections of previous work in circulation, this
one is fully appropriate on any reasonable standard of who's work should
be published in this way. There are very few philosophers of whom one
can legitimately give the following advice, without hyperbole: everything
he writes is worth reading. Van Inwagen is one of them.

